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A NOVEL RULE OF LIABILITY: ITS IMPLICATIONS
JOHN J. KENNELLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A NOVEL rule of liability in international air travel was proposed
at a recent meeting of the Legal Committee of the International
Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. The Committee recommended
a modification of the Montreal Interim Agreement so as to make an air
carrier absolutely liable to a limit of $100,000 per passenger, unless the
passenger himself had caused or contributed to the accident.
Presently, damages for injury or death occurring in international air
travel are limited by the Warsaw Convention or a modification of it.
The Warsaw Convention Treaty,1 initially adopted in Warsaw, Poland,
in 1929, limits damages to $8,291.87 for negligence. It is applicable to
most international air travel, except where there is a "contact" with the
United States. The Warsaw Convention Treaty was modified by an
agreement approved by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board on
May 15, 1966.'
Known as the "Montreal Interim Agreement," it prescribes a $75,000
maximum liability, regardless of fault, whenever the air travel has a
"contact" with the United States, namely, whenever any place in the
United States constitutes the point of origin, destination, or an agreed
stopping place. The Hague Protocol, which entered into force on
August 1, 1963, modifies the Warsaw Convention by increasing the
maximum liability of airlines in international travel to $16,582. The
Hague Protocol was not ratified by the United States This limitation of
liability applies to airlines only, and not to manufacturers or any other
party. Virtually none of the general public, and few lawyers or judges,
are aware of the possible limitation of recovery against a negligent air-
line of a mere $8,291.87." During the period of more than forty years
since its adoption, the international air carriers have come to rely upon
* Ph.B., LL.B., Loyola Univ. Attorney. Chicago, Ill.
The Warsaw Convention, opened for signature October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
137 L.N.T.S. 11.
Montreal Interim Agreement, adopted May 19, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1521, T.I.A.S. 6108.
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4 The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 22.
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the Warsaw Convention to completely insulate them from liability for
more than $8,300 for any negligently caused injury or death in inter-
national travel not having a "contact" with the United States. Even as
amended by the Interim Agreement of 1966, the Convention purportedly
shelters airlines from liability in excess of $75,000 for the negligently
inflicted death or injury of any passenger occurring during international
air travel which has a contact with the United States.
II. HISTORY OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Generically, the Warsaw Convention was the result of two inter-
national conferences, in Paris in 1925 and in Warsaw in 1929, and of
the work done by the Interim Comit6 International Technique d'Experts
Juridique A6riens (CITEJA) created by the Paris Conference. The
project of the Conference was twofold. First, since aviation was obviously
going to link many lands with different languages, customs, and legal
systems, it was desirable to establish a certain degree of uniformity. The
Convention achieved this almost completely as to documentation-
tickets, waybills, and the like. The second goal was to limit the potential
liability of the carrier in case of accidents. The Convention established
the rule that carriers are liable for damage sustained by a passenger in
the course of a flight or while embarking or disembarking, but limited
this liability to 125,000 Poincar6 francs.' This limit was low even in
1929, but it was expected that applied uniformity on international
flights, it would enable airlines to attract capital during their infancy.
In 1933, the State Department transmitted its approval to the Presi-
dent, who submitted the Treaty to the Senate. On June 15, 1934, with-
out debate, committee hearing, or report, the Senate gave its advice and
consent by voice vote.' The United States deposited its instrument of
adherence on July 31, 1934, and the President proclaimed the Treaty
ninety days later.7 Thus, although the United States had nothing to do
with formulation of the convention and had adhered rather than ratified,
it was virtually a charter member.
In critically evaluating the seemingly precipitate action of the Senate,
it must be remembered that in 1933 economic conditions throughout the
world were disastrous. There was virtually no international air transporta-
tion at that time and the few who engaged in such transportation flew
in four and six-passenger planes on short European trips. The accident
rate was substantially greater than at present. There was no capital for
any industries, let alone airlines. All of these reasons for extending
5 Id.
6See 78 CONG. REc. 11582 (1934).
749 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (1934).
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preferential treatment to airlines have not only disappeared, but the op-
posite is now the fact.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION,
MONTREAL INTERIM AGREEMENT, AND THE PROPOSED TREATY.
For many years prior to 1966, the United States and other nations
were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the arbitrary limitation of
damages prescribed by the Warsaw Convention. On September 28, 1955,
the Hague Protocol was drafted, and it became effective August 1, 1963,
as to those nations which ratified it. The Hague Protocol increased the
Warsaw Convention limitation from $8,291 to $16,582, but was not
ratified by the United States because the increase was considered nom-
inal. The United States then served notice of denunciation of the War-
saw Convention, to become effective May 15, 1966. Shortly before this
was to become effective, the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) brought about an arrangement among air carriers having land-
ing privileges in the United States, which increased the limitation of lia-
bility of signatory airlines to $75,000 per passenger on an international
flight, regardless of negligence. On May 13, 1966, the Civil Aeronautics
Board "approved" this agreement, and on May 14, 1966, the United
States Government withdrew its notice of denunciation. Thus, the net
effect of the agreement approved by the CAB is that certain airlines
agreed among themselves to increase the payment for either a death or
injury in international air travel to a maximum of $75,000, regardless
of the extent of damages inflicted by their negligent operation.
Even though the Hague Protocol was not adopted by the United States,
its limitation might apply to an American citizen engaged in an inter-
national flight covered by the Hague Protocol. Such a flight would be
one in which the origin and destination on the contract of carriage con-
sist of signatories to the Hague Protocol. Thus, the determination of
which limitation applies has no connection with the citizenship of the
passenger.
The conflicts resulting from the three separate limitations of liability,
imposed by the Warsaw Convention of 1929, the Hague Protocol of
1955 and the Montreal Interim Agreement of 1966, may lead to in-
congruous results, unjust in some instances to passengers, in others to
airlines, and in still others to aircraft manufacturers, aircraft component
part makers, and the United States Government. These limitations of
liability are not related to safety or risk. They are based solely upon such
determinants as the point of destination, or point of origin, or agreed
stopping place. The limitations apply to passengers from all nations, who
may be restricted in damages for injury or death in international flight
to one of three different recoveries for no logical or economic reason
1971]
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whatever. The source of the authority of the State Department or CAB
to impose upon the passenger public of the United States a $75,000
limitation is not clear. By analogy, it is as though the Vehicle Commis-
sioner of New York were to agree to a $75,000 limitation of damages
applicable to the taxicab companies in New York, for any injury or
death which occurs to any passenger in a taxicab.
A new treaty has been proposed which would supersede the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Interim Agreement to the extent that it
is adopted within the community of nations. Citizens of other countries
have every right to criticize the Montreal Interim Agreement, which
favors the American passenger public and requires passengers from other
countries to pay for the preferential treatment accorded to American
citizens. One advantage of the new treaty would be equal treatment for
the passenger public. The fallacy of this proposed new treaty, however,
is that it is wrongfully assumed that a treaty which would insulate com-
mercial airlines against the imposition of otherwise allowable fair
damages may be imposed constitutionally upon the international air
traveling public. The most serious constitutional defect of the proposed
treaty is that it would limit liability for damages in favor of only airlines.
Aircraft manufacturers, suppliers of component parts, the United States
and all other parties, would enjoy no such preferential treatment. The
following examples illustrate the discriminatory effect of the proposed
treaty on these various other parties.
A. Effect on Manufacturers Alone
If a jumbo-jet from Chicago enroute to London with 400 businessmen
aboard, and crashes on take-off due to a combination of negligence of
the airline and breach of warranty by a manufacturer of a component
part, and damages are set at $500,000 per passenger, payment under
the new treaty would be as follows:
(1) the airline, guilty of negligence, would be limited to payment
of $100,000 per passenger or 20% of the total damages;
(2) the manufacturer, guilty of breach of warranty, would be
liable for the remaining 80% of the damages, or $400,000
per passenger.
Moreover, in many instances the airline, although at fault, could
recover from the manufacturer, which was not at fault, all amounts paid
by it to the families of its passenger victims. The law, at least in the
United States, is now clear that an airline is entitled to full indemnity
from a manufacturer which delivers an unsafe airplane, or a component
part maker, which manufactures a defective part, even though the air-
line was negligent."
I Cf. Texaco, Inc. v. McGraw Lumber Co., 117 I11. App. 2d 351, 254 N.E. 2d 584
(1969), contra 13 ALR 3d 1100-01 (1970).
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B. Effect on Manufacturers and the United States Government
If a jumbo-jet from Chicago to Paris with 400 businessmen aboard
crashes on take-off due to: (a) 90% negligence of the airline; (b) 5%
negligence of the manufacturer for failure, for example, to issue com-
plete operating instructions or some other relatively minimal negligent
omission, which nonetheless constitutes a concurrent proximate cause
of the accident; and (c) 5% negligence of the United States by reason
of the relatively small (compared to the airline) degree of fault of the
tower operator, and the payments are $500,000 for the death of each of
the passengers, payments are made as follows:
(1) the airline, 90% at fault, pays only $100,000 out of each
$500,000 paid;
(2) the manufacturer, 5% at fault, pays $200,000 per passenger;
(3) the United States, also being 5% at fault, pays $200,000 per
passenger.
Of the $200,000,000 paid, the airline, 90% at fault, pays $40,000,000.
The manufacturer, only 5% at fault, pays $80,000,000. The United
States also pays $80,000,000, although only 5% at fault.
In this and many other types of easily imaginable situations, United
States taxpayers and manufacturers throughout the world could be forced
to pay a disproportionate share of the total damages, although their
negligence was much less than that of the common carrier airline, or in
the case of manufacturers, the manufacturers might not have been
negligent at all.
C. Discriminatory Preference of Airlines over Individuals
An American businessman purchases a ticket in Paris to fly to London.
Due to the negligence of the airline, he is killed during landing in
London. His family is limited to $100,000, even though actual damages
may be much greater. If the same passenger disembarks from the air-
craft, and is walking across the street outside the airport, and is killed
due to the negligent operation of an automobile by another person, in-
cluding an American citizen, the negligent driver is liable for full dam-
ages. The airlines thus are granted preference over not only other com-
peting carriers and manufacturers, but also over individual citizens.
D. Discriminatory Preference of Airlines over Competing Carriers
A commercial aircraft is flying from Chicago to Jamaica, via Florida.
Due to the negligence of the airline, the aircraft crashes while landing in
Florida. The liability of the airline is limited to $100,000 for the death
of passengers ticketed through to Jamaica, whether they intend to stay
on the same airplane or intend to transfer to another airline. If a pas-
senger traveling the same route were killed in a bus or train collision,
the carrier would enjoy no such limitation.
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E. Discriminatory Preference of Airlines over Component Part
Manufacturers
A 747 is scheduled to fly from Chicago to London. Several tires are
defective and the airline has knowledge of this. The aircraft crashes
during takeoff due to the failure of the tires. The cost of the tires was
less than 1 / 100 of 1 % of the value of the aircraft. The airline mani-
festly was grossly negligent for attempting to take off with defective
tires. Yet, if 400 passengers are killed, and each passenger's family
receives $500,000 in damages, the tire manufacturer will be required to
pay $400,000 per passenger, whereas the airline is required to pay only
$100,000 per passenger.
If the airline did not actually know the tires were defective, it might
be able to recover from the tire manufacturer its payments of forty
million dollars, as well as hull damages of approximately twenty-five
million dollars. Thus, the tire manufacturer may pay two hundred
million dollars for a single accident, and the airline nothing.
F. Discriminatory Preference of Airlines over General Aviation
Operators
A 747 is circling in a traffic pattern while waiting to land at O'Hare
Field in Chicago, enroute from London. A small general aviation cor-
porate aircraft and the 747 collide. Assume that each is at fault. If the
400 passengers on the 747 are killed and payments of $500,000 per
passenger are made, the airline pays forty million dollars and the oper-
ator of the small aircraft pays one hundred sixty million dollars.
G. Discriminatory Preference of Airlines over General Aviation
Manufacturers
Assume the same facts as stated above, except that the accident occurs
due to combined negligence of the commercial jetliner and altimeter
failure in the small, privately owned aircraft. In such cases, the general
aircraft manufacturer is liable for four-fifths of the total damages, or
one hundred sixty million dollars, whereas the commercial airline's ex-
posure would only be forty million dollars.
H. Discriminatory Preference of Airlines over Other Companies and
Individuals
A 747, taking off from Chicago to London, is negligently operated so
as to collide with a gasoline truck, whose operator is also negligent. The
collision causes an explosion and fire. Assume 400 passengers are killed
and the payment per passenger is $500,000. Despite its negligence, the
airline pays $100,000 maximum per passenger or forty million dollars,
whereas the owner of the gasoline truck would be liable for unlimited
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damages, which in this instance could well exceed one hundred sixty
million dollars.
I. Effect on the Airlines Themselves
Suppose 10,000 passengers are in the international embarkation ter-
minal of a United States airport, waiting to board various aircraft for
international flight. Due to arson and vandalism this international em-
barkation terminal is burned and all of the passengers are killed or
severely injured. The 10,000 passengers waiting to board aircraft for
international flights are "passengers"' and if they are killed due to
sabotage, their families are entitled to recover up to $100,000 per death
under the proposed new treaty. This could result in the imposition of an
aggregate liability upon these international airlines of up to one billion
dollars. The liability of an international air carrier could extend in sim-
ilar situations to passengers in embarkation terminals throughout the
world.
Likewise, in the recent Jordanian tragedy, if the passengers had been
killed by the guerrillas, their families would be entitled to full payment of
up to $100,000 from the international air carriers.
Thus, airlines may well have a valid basis for claiming that the treaty
is unconstitutional as applied to them. They could very well question the
validity of a treaty which would impose against them damages of one
billion dollars for the deaths of 10,000 international passengers who are
killed as a result of the criminal acts of others.
J. Effect on Passengers as Compared to Other Victims
The proposed treaty applies only to commercial airlines and their
passengers. What happens if a commercial airliner crashes into a popu-
lated area? Are the passengers to be limited to $100,000 per person,
whereas persons who are killed or injured on the ground may receive
unlimited damages against the airline?
K. Discriminatory Preference of International over Domestic Air
Carriers
A Lufthansa 747 takes off from Chicago enroute to Frankfurt, Ger-
many, at the same time that a United DC-8 takes off from Chicago for
New York. They collide over Pennsylvania due to negligence of both
airlines. The 400 passengers in the 747 are killed. Payments of $500,000
per death are made. The 100 passengers in the United Air Lines DC-8
are killed and $500,000 per death is also paid. Under the proposed
treaty, the liability would be as follows:
(1) Lufthansa Airlines-
(a) As to its own passengers in which the aggregate liability
The Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 18, sec. 2.
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is two hundred million dollars, assuming payments per
passenger are $500,000, it pays only forty million dollars.
(b) As to the passengers in the United Air Lines plane, as-
suming an aggregate amount of fifty million dollars, the
damages would be divided equally.
(2) United Air Lines-
(a) As to the passengers in the Lufthansa plane, with aggre-
gate damages of two hundred million dollars, it pays one
hundred sixty million dollars or four-fifths of the total
damages due the passengers in the Lufthansa plane.
(b) As to its passengers, as noted above, the damages are
divided equally.
Therefore, Lufthansa pays seventy-five million dollars and United Air
Lines pays one hundred eighty-five million dollars, even though both are
equally at fault.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED TREATY ON INSURERS
Some proponents of this treaty seem to think that this preferential
treatment of airlines is going to be beneficial to their insurers. Examina-
tion of this premise reveals its invalidity. This treaty will not benefit in-
surers. For all practical purposes it will eliminate insurers, as far as air-
lines are concerned. The major international trunk carriers who are to
be singled out for such preferential treatment, to the detriment of manu-
facturers, etc., will not need excess insurance coverage. In fact, most of
the major airlines undoubtedly will eliminate all passenger liability in-
surance, whether at the primary or excess levels. If a major airline
knows that its liability is an unbreakable maximum of $100,000 per
passenger regardless of its degree of fault, what need is there for insur-
ance? Insurance, traditionally and practically, is designed to insure risks.
But there will be no risks. Thus, if this proposed treaty is adopted, there
appears to be little question but that excess or reinsurance companies
will be immediately eliminated for all practical purposes from the insur-
ance market, insofar as airlines are concerned, and within a short time,
primary insurance carriers will also become extinct as far as most inter-
national air carriers are concerned.
Liability insurance companies serve two purposes: to insure risks and
to investigate and to litigate or settle claims. The imposition of unbreak-
able damage limits may eliminate the need for insurance companies.
Airline insurance companies have not done such an unsatisfactory job
of serving the airline industry and the passenger public that they should
promote a treaty which will eliminate their writing insurance coverage
for airlines in relation to international travel.
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Concededly, much can be done to improve the administration of
justice in respect to major aviation litigation. However, there does not
seem to be much logic for the attempts of international airlines and
strangely some of their insurance carriers to impose arbitrary damage
limitations applicable only to airlines.
Some representatives of insurance companies apparently think, para-
doxical as it may sound, that they are going to go on getting high insur-
ance premiums, and at the same time be the recipients of an unbreakable
damage limit. That would indeed be the best of all possible worlds for
insurance companies. But I believe these representatives underestimate
the intelligence of airline executives and regulatory boards. There would
be no reason whatever for most airlines to carry any liability insurance
if they know that they are totally and completely protected from damage
suits of any kind, and if insurance is carried the premiums would have
to be drastically reduced immediately. Although some smaller foreign
carriers will continue to carry insurance, it is obvious that the large
trunk lines, such as Pan American, TWA, etc., would be foolish to pay
for liability insurance coverage, if such a treaty were adopted.
Insurance litigation will only increase. The airlines will be seeking
reimbursement from the manufacturers or governments in a vast number
of cases and families of passengers will employ the $100,000 recoveries
from the airlines to sue the manufacturers. Illogical, divergent measures
of legal responsibility, applicable to domestic carriers, as distinguished
from international carriers, will lead to an enormous amount of litigation
in collision cases between domestic and international carriers. In cases
involving alleged air traffic control errors, the plaintiffs will seek full
recoveries against the United States Government, and in many instances,
the international airlines will seek reimbursement from the United States
for their payments to passengers. Even if the imposition of restricted
damages applicable to international air travel were socially desirable and
economically necessary, the same argument could be presented for all
other enterprises.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED TREATY
There may have been a valid economic reason in 1933 for the Warsaw
Convention treaty which insulated airlines from liability in excess of a
stipulated amount. When the Warsaw Treaty was intially drafted in the
late 1920's, international air travel was virtually non-existent, and flying
was very hazardous. Capital was difficult to obtain. Passenger planes
were able to fly but short distances of approximately 400 miles and were
able to carry only a few passengers. Contrast those economic facts with
the economic facts of the present. International air carriers carry millions
of passengers in aircraft capable of carrying as many as 400 passengers.
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Amazing safety records have been made in the last decade, since the
jet age began. Fatal accidents are considerably less per passenger mile
than twenty years ago, although there are more and much faster planes.
This is a tribute to the entire aircraft industry worldwide and to all
governments which are concerned with aircraft safety. For example,
during 1970, there were approximately 150,000,000 travelers upon
commercial airlines in the United States alone. Yet there was not a single
crash in 1970 in any State of the United States of a scheduled commercial
carrier aircraft. A person flying from Chicago to Florida via commercial
airline is statistically safer than if he were to drive an automobile for
that distance. In fact, the International Civil Aviation Organization
recently reported that 1970 was the safest year in the history of com-
mercial aviation in respect to both international and domestic air travel.
Although the aircraft industry and the governments of the world are
confronted with a serious problem because of vastly increasing air travel
and planes, the industry and such governments, to a considerable extent,
have successfully resolved safety problems since the jet age began in 1959.
When the Warsaw Convention Treaty was initially adopted, manu-
facturers and component part makers were not liable to passengers, the
"reason" being the absence of "privity" between the manufacturers and
the passengers. Likewise, when the Warsaw Treaty was initially adopted,
the United States Government was not liable for negligence of air traffic
controllers because of the doctrine of "sovereign immunity." Thus, there
was no need for the authors of these treaties to concern themselves with
insulation of manufacturers or governments. This is no longer the case.
Manufacturers can be held liable to passengers or their families, even
though the manufacturers are not negligent, because of the doctrine of
strict liability. 0 Likewise, the United States Government is liable for
unlimited damages for any negligent acts or omissions of its Air Traffic
Control and weather personnel, as well as its military aircraft for negli-
gence within the United States. Therefore, there is no longer any rational
basis for having laws applicable to the aviation industry which are
markedly different from the laws applicable to all companies and all
entities.
Under basic American constitutional law, no statute or treaty may take
away from the family of a wrongful death victim that fair recovery to
which it is entitled under the common law. In Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc.," the United States Supreme Court squarely overruled The
Harrisburg" and later decisions following The Harrisburg, which in
"Goldberg & Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81, 240
N.Y.S. 2d 592 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, comments § 402A (1965).
11 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
12 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
A NOVEL RULE OF LIABILITY
effect followed the alleged common law rule that there is no civil action
for wrongful death in the absence of statute. The Court, in this landmark
decision which has far-reaching consequences, flatly rejected the alleged
common law rule denying civil action for wrongful death, stating:
Our analysis of the history of the common-law rule indicates that it
was based on a particular set of factors that had, when The Harrisburg
was decided, long since been thrown into discard even in England, and
that had never existed in this country at all.
Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which are
compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice
suggests that a violation should be nonactionable simply because it was
serious enough to cause death. On the contrary, that rule has been
criticized ever since its inception, and described in such terms as 'bar-
barous.'
Legal historians have concluded that the sole substantial basis for the
rule at common law is a feature of the early English law that did not
survive into this century-the felony-merger doctrine.
The first explicit statement of the common-law rule against recovery
for wrongful death was in the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, sitting at
nisi prius, in Baker v. Bolton, Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
That opinion did not cite authority, nor give supporting reasoning . . .
in announcing that '[i]n a civil court, the death of a human being could
not be complained of as an injury.'
The historical justification marshalled for the rule in England never
existed in this country. . . . American courts generally adopted the
English rule as the common law of this country as well. Throughout the
period of this adoption . . . the courts failed to produce any satis-
factory justification for applying the rule in this country.13
The decision concluded:
The most likely reason that the English rule was adopted in this
country without much question is simply that it had the blessing of age.
• . . The American courts never made the inquiry whether this par-
ticular English rule, bitterly criticized in England, 'was applicable to
their situation,' and it is difficult to imagine on what basis they might
have concluded that it was.
The Fifth Circuit Court, through Chief Judge Brown, in Hornsby v.
The Fishmeal Co.,1" stated: "There is now a cause of action for wrong-
ful death in admiralty that is not dependent on adjacent state law."
Commenting on Moragne, the court said: "Time and tide do not wait,
but Courts do. What was perplexing issue has been resolved by the de-
liverance of the Supreme Court, an event for which we hopefully
waited." The Hornsby decision, following Moragne, erased for all time,
within the United States, any wrongful death statutes or treaties which
would deprive families of victims of aircraft disasters or any accident,
13 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
14431 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1970).
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of fair recoveries, based upon pecuniary loss and the other criteria of
damages.
It is fundamental that any legislation or treaty which singles out any
one segment of industry for preferential treatment must have a "rational
basis." Statutory patterns which result in arbitrary discrimination have
been held violative of both state and federal constitutional safeguards.
In Shapiro v. Thompson," the United States Supreme Court in discussing
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, said: "[W]hile
the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'"
And in Harvey v. Clyde Park District,' a state court struck down the
so-called sovereign immunity statutes because they were arbitrary and
discriminated against plaintiffs and in favor of governmental entities.
A classification to be valid must rest upon material differences be-
tween the persons, activities or things included in it and those excluded,
and furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions."' A classi-
fication in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition must be founded
upon pertinent and real differences as distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial ones and must have a rational basis."8
These are but a few of the many cases which reiterate the well-
recognized rule that any statute which singles out any entity including
even a government-owned school, for preferential insulation, is uncon-
stitutional. It would seem that if statutes which attempt to restrict the
imposition of damages against governmental bodies are unconstitutional,
treaties, which are subject to the same constitutional restraints, which
attempt to discriminatorily insulate international airlines from liability
to their passengers are unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
The enormous concentration of risks necessarily involved in the use
of commercial aircraft presents a critical legal problem. Airplane safety
has been proven indeed not a myth. The insurance industry has supplied
economical protection for the aircraft industry, which has enabled that
industry to rapidly progress technologically, without being diverted by
claims problems.
The dedicated efforts of the many organizations, working constantly
toward aircraft safety, have demonstrated their effectiveness. The record
speaks for itself. A few hundred deaths a year out of 150 million pas-
15 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969).
1632 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E. 2d 573 (1965).
"tOld Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 197
(1936).
" Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940); Walters v.
City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
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sengers is an unassailable statistic, especially when compared with more
than 50,000 persons killed on highways. Certainly, statistics refute any
assertion that airplane safety is a myth. There is no basis why com-
mercial air carriers, engaged in international air travel, should be the
object of preferential treatment.
The solution to these problems is not a treaty which will protect
reckless airlines and impose 80 or more per cent of the damages upon
manufacturers, general aviation owners or operators or the United
States Government. Nor will the remedy result from an unrestrained
attack by one group of lawyers against another, or by insurance com-
panies against plaintiffs' counsel or vice versa. The remedy may result
from dispassionate dialogue which may produce measures beneficial
because they are fair, not only to the passenger public, but also to all
segments of the aviation industry.

